Do the Kurds Hold a Key to Peace?

It is possible that the key to the multiple crises of anarchy and civil war in Iraq, potential nuclear weapons in Iran, and the promotion of Islamic terrorism by many Middle Eastern states lies with the Kurds.

To explain this idea further it is necessary to consider some (brief) history. Since being conquered in the 7th century by the Ottoman Empire the Kurds have had no place to call their own. The global struggles that shaped the Middle East and Africa from colonialism through World War I resulted the in allocation of old Kurdish lands to the four modern countries of Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq.

Many failed uprisings later, the Kurds are trapped as pawns in the game of nation-states not their own. These states use the Kurdish desire for independence against one another, knowing how to raise hopes just enough to spurn an uprising here or a riot there. But there is no intention of seeing it through.

In reality each of the states involved thinks there is much to loose from the realization of an independent Kurdistan in their midst. It is indeed one of the things that the governments of all four fear the most. This is why spawning Kurdish uprisings is such an effective tool to be used against one another.

Enter the United States (and allies) who dove headlong into the Middle East without fully understanding it. The would-be “liberators” are now faced with an unraveling equilibrium and a loss of strategic initiative that threatens to unleash regional war.

An independent Kurdish state as a close ally of the United States would begin a new equilibrium. The U.S. and the Kurds could reclaim the initiative by aligning the heroic efforts of American troops with a people who share the same vision. The Kurds do not want an all-powerful theocracy. They do not want to dominate the Middle East. And, most importantly, the scourge of Islamic terrorism has not infected their society. They only want a safe place to call home; a place where they are free. If the U.S. could help create such a place, it would earn an ally as loyal as Kuwait, as powerful as Israel, and as strategically important as S. Korea.

In Iraq, the insurgency would loose steam as the focus shifts from American “occupation” to Kurdish independence. Iran would find its Kurds, the largest minority population, empowered to follow their dream. The youthful Iranian majority might soon follow suit, wanting some liberty of their own. Strategic leverage gained against Syria might finally be enough to force that government to renounce terrorism and join the modern world—with a new Kurdistan as its main trading partner.

This idea is not without potentially grave risks. For example, Turkey would be severely alienated by any move to establish a Kurdish state. Also, the Kurds themselves may not be capable of uniting so quickly. However, a bold new approach is needed. Perhaps this is the vision that leads to long-term resolution in the Middle East.